Divining the intent of the Constitution’s framers through the use of extra-Constitutional sources has become a major part of the fringe-conservative position, as we can see in books such as David Barton’s Original Intent (5/e 2008), which examines the religious beliefs of dozens of Founding Fathers in an attempt to prove that the Constitution was never intended to restrict religious expression in the public sphere, and Larry Schweikart’s What Would the Founders Say, which tries to divine the Framer’s opinions on hot-button issues from environmental protection to health care.
In both books, the original intent argument leads—as it must always led—to the uncritical amalgamation of opinions that we have been discussing. Inherent in the assertion that the Framer’s had an original intent is the assumption that they had the same intent—otherwise there would be no way to use it as an interpretive standard to begin with.
In his just-released Being George Washington, Glenn Beck spends one chapter discussing the Federal Convention. He insists that “original intent was the only intent” and that we must (like George Washington) bind ourselves to the original purposes of the men who wrote the Constitution. In summing up the convention, Beck tries to put this the original purposes of the Constitution into four succinct statements, the first and last of which illustrate the fallacy of the original intent position more than my own analysis ever could:(First Principle) The Constitution recognizes the existence of natural law. In the Declaration of Independence Thomas Jefferson referred to “the laws of Nature and Nature’s God.” Natural law recognizes the existence of God and acknowledges that God established a natural order of things for this earth and the people of this earth.
(Fourth Principle) The Constitution was created on the assumption that America would function under a free-market economy, recognizing and protecting property rights. John Adams wrote: “All men are born free and independent, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of . . . protecting property.”[1]
Both of these propositions give us a lot to argue about. It is not at all obvious, for example, that the Jeffersonian notion of “natural law” included a God that modern American Christians would recognize as such. As an Enlightenment Deist, Jefferson saw God as something like the sum total of the laws of nature rather than as a personal deity who interacted with the human race. Furthermore, neither Jefferson nor Adams would have even understood the term “free-market economy” as we understand it today. Jefferson in particular saw America as a primarily agrarian economy, and he viewed all kinds of financial markets with suspicion.
Two facts, however, are beyond dispute: 1) that Jefferson did not attend the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787; and 2) that Adams didn’t attend it either. At the time the two men were ministers to, respectively, France and England, and they knew only as much about the Constitution as they read in letters from home. Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of Massachusetts (the source of the Adams quotation) are very different things than the U.S. Constitution, and there is no historically acceptable way to use the words found in one of them to support an originalist interpretation of the others. Such an interpretive strategy only makes sense if we assume absolutely ideological unity among the Founders, which is a really dumb thing to do.
I believe that “original intent” is a spectacularly bad standard for interpreting the supreme law of the land. I do not say this as an America-hating liberal who sees the Constitution as a “living, breathing document” that can mean anything that we want it to mean. I believe that we must interpret the Constitution according to the meaning of its words, with careful attention to how those words were used in their historical context. Words mean things, and those meanings matter. Where the Constitution is concerned, meanings matter very much; if the Constitution does not have fixed meanings, we do not live under the rule of law.
But interpreting the Constitution according to the meaning of its words—the jurisprudential standard known as “originalism”—is very different than interpreting it according to the intentions of its authors. Nobody has drawn this distinction more clearly than Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who, though often cited as an exemplar of the Framer’s intent standard of interpretation, rejects that standard in no uncertain terms:
It is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. That seems to me one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so they could not be easily read. Government by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”[2]
The view of original intent propounded by the fringe conservatives is directly at odds with the democratic principles they espouse, the common sense they advocate, and even the Supreme Court Justice they revere. This difference between “original meaning” and “original intent” may seem slight, but it separates Scalia’s mainstream conservatism from that of the right-wing fringe. Scalia himself alluded to this distinction in a 1997 lecture at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. When asked whether or not he would consider scaling back the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through an originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, he replied, “I am an originalist. I am a textualist. I am not a nut.”[3]
Unfortunately, many of those driving public opinion and government policy in the era of the Tea Party cannot say the same.
[1] Beck, Being George Washington : the indispensable man, as you've never seen him: 240-44.
[2] Antonin Scalia and Amy Gutmann, A matter of interpretation : federal courts and the law : an essay, The University Center for Human Values series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). 17.
[3] Antonin Scalia, "On Interpreting the Constitution," http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/wl1997.htm.
